https://vulnfeed.org/Every disclosure, as it lands. Critical-only feed available.enhttps://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-102894/https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-102894/Wed, 04 Nov 2026 22:17:44 +0000GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. From 0.7.1 until 2.2.2, the /auth/saml/callback endpoint decoded SAML XML, used its NameID and attributes to resolve or provision a user, and minted a gpustack_session JWT without calling OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response to verify the signature, issuer, audience, destination, or time conditions. Any network client could submit an identity for an existing user, including an administrator, or provision a new non-administrator account, even when SAML was not configured. Response and Assertion identifiers were not consumed, so captured signed responses could also be replayed. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.2.https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-103002/https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-103002/Wed, 04 Nov 2026 22:17:44 +0000GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. From 2.2.0 until 2.2.2, cluster_apiserver_proxy forwarded an authenticated non-administrator's requests to a selected Kubernetes cluster without a resource-level authorization check. The proxy used a reachable worker's Kubernetes ServiceAccount credentials, so the caller could read sensitive resources, create or modify workloads, or delete resources according to that ServiceAccount's permissions. Exploitation required a Kubernetes-provider cluster with a reachable worker, and attacker-controlled workloads could result in code execution in the target cluster. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.2.https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-102895/https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-102895/Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:16:59 +0000GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. Prior to 2.2.0, get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator when force_auth_localhost was false, which was the default. A remote request could appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 because client_ip_getter accepted a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP loopback value. The bypass allowed unauthenticated administrative access, including user and model changes, persistent administrator API-key creation, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0.