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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>VulnFeed.org: readest</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/</link><description>Every disclosure, as it lands. Critical-only feed available.</description><language>en</language><atom:link href="https://vulnfeed.org/feed/product/readest.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>CVE-2026-57566: Readest: Unauthenticated SSRF / open request proxy in /api/opds/proxy</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-57566/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-57566/</guid><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:44:27 +0000</pubDate><description>Readest is a modern, feature-rich ebook reader designed for seamless cross-platform access and an intuitive reading experience. Prior to 0.11.10, the unauthenticated /api/opds/proxy route in apps/readest-app/src/app/api/opds/proxy/route.ts accepted an attacker-controlled URL and fetched it server-side without restricting the scheme, blocking private, loopback, link-local, or metadata hosts, or revalidating destinations during automatic redirect following. The route also accepted caller-controlled outbound headers and Authorization values and reflected the upstream status and response body. A remote attacker could use the service as an open request proxy and, on Node, Docker, or other self-hosted deployments with internal-network access, retrieve cloud metadata or internal-service responses. Cloudflare Workers deployments restrict access to link-local and private destinations, which reduces the internal-network impact there, but the unauthenticated public fetch-and-reflect behavior remains. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.10.</description></item><item><title>CVE-2026-57567: Readest: Unscoped Tauri IPC download_file/upload_file allow arbitrary local file write and read from the webview</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-57567/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-57567/</guid><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:43:03 +0000</pubDate><description>Readest is a modern, feature-rich ebook reader designed for seamless cross-platform access and an intuitive reading experience. In affected desktop Tauri builds prior to 0.11.10, the apps/readest-app/src-tauri/src/transfer_file.rs commands download_file and upload_file accepted a webview-controlled file_path and passed it to File::create or File::open without checking the Tauri filesystem scope, rejecting absolute paths, or blocking parent-directory traversal. The commands were registered in the global invoke handler for the main, updater, and reader-* windows, so JavaScript executing in the privileged application origin could write attacker-controlled content to any path writable by the process or read and send any path readable by the process. Exploitation requires JavaScript execution in that privileged origin, such as through an application XSS or compromised renderer; whether book-embedded JavaScript can reach the parent origin was not established. The write primitive can overwrite trusted or startup files, while the read primitive can expose keys, tokens, and application secrets. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.10.</description></item></channel></rss>
