<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>VulnFeed.org: roostorg coop</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/</link><description>Every disclosure, as it lands. Critical-only feed available.</description><language>en</language><atom:link href="https://vulnfeed.org/feed/product/roostorg-coop.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>CVE-2026-63398: Coop has SAML cross-tenant authentication bypass</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-63398/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-63398/</guid><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 22:44:43 +0000</pubDate><description>Coop is an open source review and moderation tool from ROOST. Prior to 1.0.2, the SAML strategy&apos;s verify callback resolved the authenticated user by email alone using `kyselyUserFindByEmail`, without binding the lookup to the organization in `/saml/login/:orgId/callback`. An attacker who administers an organization and controls its SAML IdP signing key can submit an assertion for a victim email to another organization&apos;s callback when that target organization has registered the same signing certificate. The assertion verifies against the target certificate, and the email resolves to the target user, creating a session as that user and allowing full cross-tenant account takeover without privileges in the target organization. Exploitation requires the unusual configuration in which the target certificate matches a signing key controlled by the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.</description></item><item><title>CVE-2026-63396: Coop has a data leak via unauthenticated GraphQL Query.allOrgs</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-63396/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-63396/</guid><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 22:42:12 +0000</pubDate><description>Coop is an open source review and moderation tool from ROOST. Prior to 1.0.0, an unauthenticated actor can query `Query.allOrgs` through `/api/v1/graphql` on a publicly accessible deployment and obtain data for all organizations, including organization IDs, names, email addresses, website URLs and on-call alert email addresses. The `usersWhoCanReviewEveryQueue` field also exposes reviewing users&apos; IDs, email addresses, first and last names, roles, permissions and creation dates. Running the service on an authenticated private network prevents outside actors from directly querying the GraphQL API. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0.</description></item></channel></rss>
