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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>VulnFeed.org: ultravioletrs cocos</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/</link><description>Every disclosure, as it lands. Critical-only feed available.</description><language>en</language><atom:link href="https://vulnfeed.org/feed/product/ultravioletrs-cocos.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>CVE-2026-119344: Cocos Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to Diversion Attacks</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-119344/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-119344/</guid><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 15:58:32 +0000</pubDate><description>Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for AI. In version 0.8.2 and earlier, Cocos AI accepts trusted execution environment attestation Evidence when firmware patch levels and software measurements match, without binding the Evidence to an allowed platform owner or unique machine identity and without enforcing revocation. A remote attacker who controls or compromises another platform trusted by the same verifier can substitute valid Evidence from that platform and cause authorization of the wrong platform. This vulnerability is addressed in 0.9.0. However, this vulnerability can&apos;t be patched in source code alone, since the vulnerability arises from the confidential computing threat model itself.</description></item><item><title>CVE-2026-119345: Cocos AI Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to TOCTOU Attacks</title><link>https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-119345/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://vulnfeed.org/cve/CVE-2026-119345/</guid><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 15:53:42 +0000</pubDate><description>Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for AI. Prior to 0.9.0, Cocos AI performs attestation only once when an attested TLS connection is established. An attacker who can modify the attester&apos;s workload code, memory-backed state, configuration, or attached devices after that check can keep the existing connection open while the peer continues trusting stale initial Evidence. This gap is especially significant for long-lived connections because the verifier has no mechanism to detect the changed state. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.</description></item></channel></rss>
