vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled

Summary

vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.32.0, an authenticated caller can place forged shared-memory address and monotonic_id values in public multimodal features.kwargs_data. In scale-out deployments with shared-memory multimodal caching enabled, workers trust those values and pass attacker-selected bytes to pickle.loads(), allowing arbitrary Python execution even when insecure serialization is disabled. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.

Remediation

1. Inventory every Vllm Vllm deployment, including staging.
2. Upgrade Vllm Vllm to 0.32.0.
3. Confirm the running version after the upgrade.

References

• Patchhttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/3d5625cc3c2474994107047d7a6ecb8e4008f9b0
• Patchhttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/59357
• Patchhttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w
• Advisoryhttps://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w
• Referencehttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.32.0
• Referencehttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115912