Atlantis: OS command injection through PR-controlled Terraform workspace enables RCE during plan

Summary

Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. From version 0.4.0 until 0.47.1, Atlantis passes the pull-request-controlled workspace value from atlantis.yaml into Terraform command arguments that are joined with strings.Join(args, " ") and executed through sh -c. An authenticated contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the Atlantis service account without custom workflows, apply permission, or a malicious Terraform provider. External contributors can reach the flaw through fork pull requests only when --allow-fork-prs is enabled, while eligible same-repository branches do not require that option. The commands inherit the Atlantis process environment and can access cloud-provider, Terraform, and version-control credentials as well as files, state, and network resources available to the service. This issue is fixed in version 0.47.1.

Remediation

1. Inventory every runatlantis atlantis deployment, including staging.
2. No fixed version appears in the public sources yet. Check the references below and the vendor directly.

References

• Referencehttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security/advisories/GHSA-rjh2-4xgw-p2hj
• Referencehttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/6792
• Referencehttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/8dd22b4d0a9d7c129fdbf6a3398dd1c4cf8c3a59
• Referencehttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/f04df0d53f0544d9eb6f5026dd8b74fbefd82ac8
• Referencehttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.47.1