AshAuthentication TOTP setup lets a user install their own authenticator secret on another user's account

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows a user with an account to install a TOTP secret they control on another user's account, and then sign in as that user or hold their second factor. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange verified a setup token but did not check that it was issued to the record being confirmed, so an attacker's own pending secret could be confirmed onto another user's record. The TOTP setup changes, ConfirmSetupChange, GeneratePendingSetupChange and GenerateSecretChange, also marked their changesets as AshAuthentication interactions, which the standard AshAuthenticationInteraction policy bypass lets through. A policy limiting setup and confirm_setup to the actor's own record therefore never ran when an application exposed those actions by record key, and a direct setup call on another user's record returned that user's pending secret and setup token. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.16.

Remediation

1. Inventory every team-alembic ash_authentication deployment, including staging.
2. Upgrade team-alembic ash_authentication to 5.0.0-rc.16.
3. Confirm the running version after the upgrade.

References

• Patchhttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574
• Advisoryhttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-gx67-694c-655c
• Referencehttps://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-119215.html
• Referencehttps://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-119215
• Referencehttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/6e7a880698614887527a87df206b4eb0c0fbd8c1