Cocos Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to Diversion Attacks

Summary

Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for AI. In version 0.8.2 and earlier, Cocos AI accepts trusted execution environment attestation Evidence when firmware patch levels and software measurements match, without binding the Evidence to an allowed platform owner or unique machine identity and without enforcing revocation. A remote attacker who controls or compromises another platform trusted by the same verifier can substitute valid Evidence from that platform and cause authorization of the wrong platform. This vulnerability is addressed in 0.9.0. However, this vulnerability can't be patched in source code alone, since the vulnerability arises from the confidential computing threat model itself.

Remediation

1. Inventory every ultravioletrs cocos deployment, including staging.
2. No fixed version appears in the public sources yet. Check the references below and the vendor directly.

References

• Referencehttps://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos/security/advisories/GHSA-v5m8-5wxc-vjgp
• Referencehttps://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3779208.3785387
• Referencehttps://doi.org/10.1145/3779208.3785387
• Referencehttps://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos/releases/tag/v0.9.0
• Referencehttps://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/platform-ownership-endorsements.html