OpenVM's OpenVmHalo2Verifier self-call can bypass proof verification

Summary

OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Before 1.7.0 in the 1.x line and in affected 2.0 and 2.1 prereleases, `OpenVmHalo2Verifier.verify` constructs raw proof calldata from user-controlled `proofData`, performs a `staticcall` to `address(this)`, and treats a successful call as proof acceptance. If the first four proof bytes match another external selector exposed by the wrapper, dispatch can invoke a successful non-verifier function instead of the generated Halo2 fallback verifier. Applications using the generated Solidity wrapper can consequently accept arbitrary app commitments and public values without checking the proof suffix, accumulator, app commitments or public values. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.0, 2.0.0-rc.3 and 2.1.0-preview.

Remediation

1. Inventory every openvm-org openvm deployment, including staging.
2. No fixed version appears in the public sources yet. Check the references below and the vendor directly.

References

• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/blob/v2.0.0-alpha/crates/sdk/contracts/template/OpenVmHalo2Verifier.sol
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/blob/v2.0.0-beta.2/crates/sdk/contracts/template/OpenVmHalo2Verifier.sol
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/blob/v2.1.0-dev.0/crates/sdk/contracts/template/OpenVmHalo2Verifier.sol
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/commit/751bdb1725254c3268782ddf8df89f19035666e3
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/pull/151
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/releases/tag/v1.7.0
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/releases/tag/v2.0.0-rc.3
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/releases/tag/v2.1.0-preview
• Referencehttps://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/security/advisories/GHSA-j29p-wr24-hp4f