traQ: Privilege escalation by OAuth prompt=none request

Summary

traQ is a messenger application built for Digital Creators Club traP. Prior to 3.28.3, OAuth2 silent authorization requests using prompt=none with an empty or omitted scope parameter check prior consent against the empty requested scope set even though all scopes registered for the client become eligible for issuance. An attacker who controls an OAuth client capable of receiving authorization codes can target a user who previously consented to only some client scopes and obtain an access token containing broader registered scopes without additional consent. A user who has never consented to the client still receives consent_required. This issue is fixed in version 3.28.3.

Remediation

1. Inventory every traPtitech traQ deployment, including staging.
2. No fixed version appears in the public sources yet. Check the references below and the vendor directly.

References

• Referencehttps://github.com/traPtitech/traQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8cfq-jgf7-8m27
• Referencehttps://github.com/traPtitech/traQ/commit/5510fe8aa9bb15fc4755c78792381dbb03d576c3
• Referencehttps://github.com/traPtitech/traQ/releases/tag/v3.28.3