Yeti: Unauthenticated Access to Full Audit Timeline Discloses All Threat Intelligence Data

Summary

Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI registers the audit router without Depends(auth.get_current_active_user), and core/web/apiv2/audit.py does not perform a route-level authentication check for /api/v2/audit/timeline/{id}. An unauthenticated network attacker can use an empty, partial, or specific wildcard path to query TimelineLog records containing the actor, target_id, action, and details fields, including analyst usernames, object identifiers and values, and before-and-after object data. This exposes the operational history of threat-intelligence objects while other application routers require authentication. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.

Remediation

1. Inventory every yeti-platform yeti deployment, including staging.
2. No fixed version appears in the public sources yet. Check the references below and the vendor directly.

References

• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/security/advisories/GHSA-34r4-95hx-gxqr
• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/pull/1276
• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/commit/692af02ffc05faabc8638b15a88765cb0e3f2503
• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/releases/tag/2.5.1