Yeti: Path traversal in DFIQ uuid allows authenticated arbitrary file write during archive export

Summary

Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, core/schemas/dfiq.py accepts an unvalidated uuid from DFIQ YAML through POST /api/v2/dfiq/from_yaml, and core/web/apiv2/dfiq.py later interpolates that stored value into an archive filesystem path in POST /api/v2/dfiq/to_archive. A low-privileged authenticated user can import a DFIQ object whose UUID contains traversal sequences and trigger archive export, causing attacker-controlled content with a .yaml suffix to be written outside the intended temporary archive directory. The impact is limited by paths writable by the YETI service account, and the separate DFIQ archive-import zip-slip candidate is not part of this vulnerability. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.

Remediation

1. Inventory every yeti-platform yeti deployment, including staging.
2. No fixed version appears in the public sources yet. Check the references below and the vendor directly.

References

• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/commit/8e36bd0000f98f625540e37eeb9f304c684e8394
• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/pull/1279
• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/releases/tag/2.5.1
• Referencehttps://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/security/advisories/GHSA-6xf2-8436-rgvf